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Abstract—This work proposes a new channel training (CT)
scheme for a full-duplex receiver to enhance physical layer
security. Equipped with NB full-duplex antennas, the receiver
simultaneously receives the information signal and transmits
artificial noise (AN). In order to reduce the non-cancellable
self-interference due to the transmitted AN, the receiver has
to estimate the self-interference channel prior to the data
communication phase. In the proposed CT scheme, the receiver
transmits a limited number of pilot symbols which are known
only to itself. Such a secret CT scheme prevents an eavesdropper
from estimating the jamming channel from the receiver to
the eavesdropper, hence effectively degrading the eavesdropping
capability. We analytically examine the connection probability
(i.e., the probability of the data being successfully decoded by the
receiver) of the legitimate channel and the secrecy outage prob-
ability due to eavesdropping for the proposed secret CT scheme.
Based on our analysis, the optimal power allocation between CT
and data/AN transmission at the legitimate transmitter/receiver
is determined. Our examination shows that the newly proposed
secret CT scheme significantly outperforms the non-secret CT
scheme that uses publicly known pilots when the number of
antennas at the eavesdropper is larger than one.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, channel training, full
duplex, artificial noise, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless communications become increasingly ubiqui-
tous, a growing amount of research has been devoted to secu-
rity issues pertaining to wireless data transmission. This is due
to the fact that wireless communications are vulnerable to se-
curity threats, such as eavesdropping and jamming attacks, due
to the open nature of the wireless medium [1], [2]. Against this
background, physical layer security is emerging as a promising
technique to realize and enhance the secrecy of wireless
communications and is also compatible and complementary
to traditional cryptographic techniques [3], [4]. For example,
the inherent randomness of a wireless channel can be utilized
to extract cryptographic keys based on channel reciprocity [5],
and physical-layer-based secure communications can be used
to distribute keys for the initialization of a wireless network
in order to support upper-layer cryptographical techniques.
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In the pioneering studies of physical layer security (e.g., [6],
[7]), a wiretap channel was established as the fundamental
model to characterize physical layer security, in which an
eavesdropper (Eve) attempts to intercept the data transmission
between a transmitter (Alice) and a legitimate receiver (Bob).
In the context of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wire-
tap channels, artificial noise (AN)-aided secure transmission
is of growing interest due to its robustness and desirable
performance (e.g., [8]–[13]). AN was initially proposed to
be transmitted in the null space of the main channel (i.e.,
the channel between Alice and Bob) by Alice to deliberately
confuse Eve while avoiding interference to Bob [8]. Then,
this AN-aided secure transmission was studied and extended in
numerous scenarios. For example, the authors of [10] proposed
an artificial fast fading scheme in order to enhance physical
layer security when Eve has more antennas than Alice. The
method of transmitting AN by a cooperative jammer (i.e.,
an external helper) was exploited (e.g., [9]). However, this
method suffers from some issues with regard to mobility,
synchronization, and trustworthiness [14], [15]. As a result of
the full-duplex techniques coming to reality [16]–[18], these
issues are being addressed by replacing the external helper by
a full-duplex receiver that can simultaneously receive infor-
mation signals and transmit AN (e.g., [14], [15], [19]–[22]).
Meanwhile, the impact of full-duplex techniques employed
by an active eavesdropper on physical layer security was
examined within a hierarchical game framework in [23].
One of the key challenges faced in designing practical
full-duplex transceivers is self-interference and thus many
techniques have been developed in the literature to suppress
it [16]–[18]. Among the different types of self-interference
cancellation techniques, the channel-aware technique has at-
tracted increasing research interest since it is normally the last
line of defense against self-interference in the digital domain
[17], [18]. In channel-aware self-interference cancellation, the
channel state information (CSI) of the self-interference chan-
nel (i.e., the channel between the transmit and receive antennas
of Bob) is first estimated and then the self-interference is sup-
pressed by beamforming or subtraction. We note that the self-
interference channel in this work refers to the channel from the
transmit antenna to the receive antenna or the channel from the
transmit RF chain to the receive RF chain when the full-duplex
Bob is achieved by connecting two RF chains to a single
antenna through a circulator [17]. This is due to the fact that
there is leakage in the circulator from the transmit RF chain to
the receive RF chain. As such, in this work we do not consider
the impact of ADC, DAC, and other hardware impairments
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on the self-interference cancellation. In the literature, [24]
examined a novel secure on-off transmission scheme with AN
by considering a practical scenario where the channel training
and feedback are limited. It is shown that considering the
training and feedback cost there exists an optimal number of
transmit antennas that maximizes the net secrecy throughput.
In addition, [25] investigated the role of AN in both the
channel training and data transmission in physical-layer secret
communications, where the AN is used to prevent Eve from
estimating the eavesdropper’s channel in the training phase and
the AN is adopted to mask the transmission of the confidential
information in the data transmission phase. However, how to
perform the self-interference channel estimation and how to
allocate transmit power between the channel training (CT)
and data transmission have not been addressed in the context
of physical layer security. These questions are of significant
importance in the design of practical communication systems
to achieve security. This is due to the fact that fewer resources
(e.g., transmit power, time slots) are left for data transmission
if more resources are allocated to channel estimation (although
more accurate channel estimation is achieved). In addition,
for channel estimation we have to consider the amount of
information about the channels that is leaked to Eve. The
secrecy performance of the wiretap channel with a full-duplex
receiver is highly related to these questions. The assumption
that the CSI of the self-interference channel is perfectly
known is widely adopted in the literature and thus the self-
interference can be fully cancelled when the full-duplex Bob
is equipped with multiple transmit or receive antennas [14].
This assumption cannot be justified in many practical scenarios
in which the self-interference channel consists of not only
deterministic direct paths but also random reflected paths from
nearby scatterers. This partially motivates this work, which,
for the first time, examines CT in the wiretap channel with a
full-duplex receiver.
In the aforementioned studies where AN is transmitted by
a cooperative jammer, the jammer has to know the channel
from the jammer to Bob (i.e., jammer-Bob channel) in order
to avoid interference to Bob. To this end, public pilots with
known transmit power have to be transmitted by the jammer
in order to enable the estimation of the jammer-Bob channel
at Bob (since they are two separate devices). Meanwhile, Eve
can estimate the channel from the jammer to Eve (i.e., jammer-
Eve channel) based on the known pilots and transmit power of
these pilots. As such, in these studies the jammer-Eve channel
is normally assumed to be known by Eve (e.g., [9]). A similar
assumption that Eve knows the jamming channel (i.e., the
channel from Bob’s transmit antennas to Eve) in the wiretap
channel with a full-duplex receiver is adopted in the literature
(e.g., [14], [22]). This assumption ignores one property of this
wiretap channel, which is that Bob knows exactly the transmit-
ted signals and transmit power. This means that the pilots and
transmit power used to estimate the self-interference channel
are not required to be public. Ignorance of this property in the
literature has meant fact that the benefits of transmitting AN by
a full-duplex Bob rather than an external jammer have not been
fully exploited. Recently, our conference paper [26] proposed
the secret CT design based on this property of the wiretap
channel with a full-duplex receiver. However, we would like to
clarify that the performance of this proposed design was only
examined through simulations in [26], which lead to the fact
that the power allocation was also determined based on these
simulations. These simulations are of high signal processing
cost, which significantly increases the implementation cost of
the proposed secret CT design. In order to fully exploit the
benefits offered by the secret CT design, in this work we
theoretically analyze the performance of this design, which
leads to the following specific contributions.
 Following our conference paper [26], in this work we
further examine the CT design problem in the context of
wiretap channels with a full-duplex receiver. Specifically,
we apply the non-secret CT scheme to the wiretap chan-
nel with a full-duplex receiver as a benchmark, based on
which we further develop a new secret CT scheme by
utilizing the fact that a full-duplex Bob knows exactly
the signal he transmits.
 In the secret CT scheme, secret pilots are utilized to
estimate the self-interference channel with limited symbol
periods to prevent Eve from obtaining the CSI of the
jamming channel, which is different from the non-secret
CT scheme that utilizes publicly known pilots to estimate
the self-interference channel. In order to fully explore
and analyze the benefits offered by the proposed secret
CT scheme, we derive closed-form expressions for its
connection probability (CP), which is the probability
that Bob successfully decodes Alice’s message, and its
secrecy outage probability (SOP). Based on the derived
CP and SOP, the optimal transmit power allocations
between CT and data/AN transmission at Alice and Bob
are determined under average power constraints.
 For the sake of comparison, we also examine the secre-
cy performance of the non-secret CT scheme and the
associated power allocation between CT and data/AN
transmission in the wiretap channel with a full-duplex
receiver. Our examination shows that our proposed secret
CT scheme significantly outperforms the non-secret CT
scheme when NE > 1, where NE is the number of
antennas at Eve. We also find that the performance
advantage of our proposed secret CT scheme increases
as NE increases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details the system model, the secret CT scheme, and the
non-secret CT scheme. Section III derives the CP and SOP
of the secret CT. Section IV presents the optimal transmit
power allocations at Alice and Bob in the secret CT scheme.
Section V provides numerical results to compare the proposed
secret and non-secret CT approaches. Finally, Section VI
makes some concluding remarks.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex number
z, jzj denotes the modulus of z. Given a complex vector x,
kxk denotes the Euclidean norm and xy denotes the conjugate
transpose of x. The LL identity matrix is referred to as IL
and E[] denotes expectation.
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Fig. 1. The wiretap channel with a full-duplex receiver, where Alice
is equipped with a single antenna, Bob is equipped with NB full-duplex
antennas, and Eve is equipped with NE antennas.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
The wiretap channel of interest is illustrated in Fig. 1, where
Alice is equipped with a single antenna, Bob is equipped with
NB full-duplex antennas, and Eve is equipped with NE anten-
nas. We assume that Bob operates in full-duplex mode, i.e., all
NB antennas are used for reception and transmission simulta-
neously. We denote h 2 CNB1 as the main channel vector,
g 2 CNE1 as the channel vector between Alice and Eve
(referred to as the eavesdropper’s channel), Gj 2 CNENB
as the jamming channel matrix, and Hs 2 CNBNB as the
self-interference channel matrix. We assume all the wireless
channels within our system model are subject to independent
quasi-static Rayleigh fading with equal block length. The self-
interference channel considered throughout this work is the
effective self-interference channel after channel-unaware inter-
ference cancellation. Following [16], [18], we know that the
deterministic components (e.g., line-of-sight components) in
the self-interference channel can be removed through channel-
unaware interference cancellation, and thus it is reasonable
to assume that the residual self-interference channel after
channel-unaware cancellation is subject to independent quasi-
static Rayleigh fading. We note that this assumption has
been widely adopted in the literature to examine the impact
of self-interference in full-duplex systems (e.g., [27]–[29]).
We further assume that the entries of h, g, Gj , and Hs
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero-
mean. We adopt the assumption that the variance of each
entry in h, g, and Gj is normalized to one, but the variance
of each entry in Hs is 2s . This assumption is to maintain
the generality of these channels, since the fading variances
(including path loss) of h, g, and Gj can be effectively
absorbed into the noise variance at Bob and the transmit
powers of Alice and Bob, while the fading variance of Hs is
quantified by 2s . This is due to the fact that only the statistical
distributions of such channels affect the design of the different
CT schemes, which will be shown in our following analysis.
The assumption that statistical information aboutGj is known
can be justified as follows. Considering the independent quasi-
static Rayleigh fading, in order to know the distribution of
Gj we only have to know the corresponding large-scale path
losses (e.g., the location of Eve). We note that Eve may
have been an active transmitter or receiver in previous time
slots, where the corresponding large-scale path losses were
estimated. Considering the static system settings, we assume
the large-scale path losses are fixed or slowly varying, which
justifies our assumption that the distribution of Gj is publicly
known. Finally, we note that this assumption is widely adopted
in the context of physical layer security (e.g., [30]) and even
a stronger assumption that the instantaneous realization of Gj
is known is also widely adopted (e.g., [8], [14], [31]).
We assume that the total duration of each block consists
of T symbol periods, including pilot and data symbols. In
the pilot symbol periods, Alice and Bob send pilots to enable
the estimation of the main channel and the self-interference
channel, respectively. The pilots used by Alice are publicly
known. During the data symbol periods, Alice transmits con-
fidential information to Bob while the full-duplex Bob sends
AN to aid this secure transmission. We denote Alice’s transmit
powers for pilots and data by PAp and PAd, respectively.
We also denote Bob’s transmit powers for pilots and AN by
PBp and PBa, respectively. We consider an average power
constraint over a fading block [32], in which the total energy
for a fading block at a transmitter (i.e., Alice or Bob) is
subject to a fixed upper bound. We also consider the passive
eavesdropping scenario, in which Alice does not know the CSI
of the eavesdropper’s channel.
B. Secret Channel Training Scheme
In the considered wiretap channel, the pilots sent by Bob to
estimate the self-interference channel can be kept secret from
Eve. This is due to the fact that Bob knows exactly what he
transmits and thus he does not have to share his pilots with
other devices. As such, we next develop a specific CT strategy
dedicated to the wiretap channel with a full-duplex receiver,
which is named as the secret CT scheme.
In this secret CT method, we first set TB = NB , where
TB is the number of symbol periods used to estimate the self-
interference channel Hs. This assumption is to guarantee a
reliable estimate of Hs at Bob according to the principle of
the Linear Minimum Mean Square Error (LMMSE) estimation
(i.e., if TB < NB Bob cannot achieve a reliable estimate of
Hs) [33]. We note that TB = NB is also a strict requirement
for the secret CT scheme, since when TB > NB , Eve can
obtain partial information about the jamming channel Gj
through blind channel estimation [34]. This is due to the
fact that once TB > NB , Eve will have more observations
than unknown parameters to estimate and thus she can apply
subspace-based channel estimation without knowing the pilots
sent by Bob. Setting TB = NB guarantees that the estimation
problem of Gj at Eve is ill-posed due to the unknown pilots,
and thus Eve cannot achieve any information about Gj in the
secret CT scheme.
To enable Bob to estimate the main channel, Alice transmits
its publicly known pilots. We note that Alice and Bob have
to transmit pilots during different symbol periods in order to
achieve orthogonality between Alice’s and Bob’s pilots, due to
the constraint TB = NB . In this work, we set the number of
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Fig. 2. A transmission block of T symbols with the secret CT scheme and
the non-secret CT scheme.
symbol periods used to estimate the main channel to be 1 since
Alice is equipped with a single antenna. We note that prior
studies on optimal training resource allocation have shown
that the optimal number of pilot equals the number of transmit
antennas (which is NB for the self-interference channel and 1
for the main channel in this work), under the average power
constraint [32]. A transmission block of T symbols with the
secret CT scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a).
When Alice transmits the pilot, the corresponding received
signal at Bob is given by
zB =
pPAphsA +wB ; (1)
where zB 2 CNB1, sA 2 C11 is the pilot transmitted by
Alice satisfying sAs
y
A = 1, and wB 2 CNB1 is the noise at
Bob with i.i.d entries, each of which follows the distribution
CN (0; 2B). Considering the LMMSE estimator, based on the
known pilot Bob achieves the estimate of h as [33]
h^ =
pPAp
PAp + 2B
zBs
y
A: (2)
Based on the properties of LMMSE estimation [33], the entries
of h^ are i.i.d and each follows the distribution CN (0; 2
h^
),
where
2
h^
=
PAp
PAp + 2B
: (3)
Again, due to the properties of LMMSE estimation, the
estimation error ~h = h   h^ is independent of h^ and the
entries of ~h are i.i.d, each of which follows the distribution
CN (0; 2~h), where
2~h =
2B
PAp + 2B
: (4)
Since Alice’s pilot is publicly known, Eve can estimate
the eavesdropper’s channel g following a similar procedure
as detailed above. Likewise, the entries of her estimate on
g, denoted by g^, are i.i.d and each of them follows the
distribution CN (0; 2g^), where
2g^ =
PAp
PAp + 2E
; (5)
and 2E is the receiver noise power at Eve. The estimation
error ~g = g   g^ is independent of g^ and the entries of ~g are
i.i.d, each of which follows the distribution CN (0; 2~g), where
2~g =
2E
PAp + 2E
: (6)
When Bob transmits pilots over NB symbol periods with
his NB full-duplex antennas, the signal at his receive antennas
is given by
ZB =
pPBpHsSB +WB ; (7)
where ZB 2 CNBNB , SB 2 CNBNB are the pilots trans-
mitted by Bob satisfying SBS
y
B = INB , and WB 2 CNBNB
is the noise at Bob with i.i.d entries, each of which follows
the distribution CN (0; 2B). Again, adopting the LMMSE
estimator (based on the known SB and 2s ) Bob obtains the
estimate of Hs as
H^s =
pPBp2s
PBp2s + 2B
ZBS
y
B : (8)
Likewise, the estimation error ~Hs = Hs   H^s is indepen-
dent of H^s and each of its entries follows the distribution
CN (0; 2~Hs), where
2~Hs =
2B
2
s
PBp2s + 2B
: (9)
When Bob transmits the pilots SB , the received signal
matrix at Eve is given by
ZE =
pPBpGjSB +WE ; (10)
where WE 2 CNENB is the noise at Eve with i.i.d entries,
each of which follows the distribution CN (0; 2E). Due to
ZE 2 CNENB and that Eve does not know the pilots SB , Eve
cannot achieve any information onGj . We note that in order to
prevent Eve from obtaining any information on Gj , the com-
munication system should be carefully designed. For example,
Eve could learn Gj based on the control messages (used to
establish the communication link, e.g., synchronization) or
feedback (e.g., used to feed back the CSI of the main channel
to Alice if Alice is equipped with multiple antennas) sent
from Bob to Alice. To prevent this, different resources (e.g.,
frequencies) must be used for control messages or feedback
than those used for data communications. In this work, we
assume that this independence can be guaranteed and Eve can
only learn statistical information (e.g., the distribution) of Gj
based on pre-existing transmissions between Alice and Bob.
We note that in the context of wireless energy transfer
(WET), a channel learning method that requires only one
feedback bit for each energy receiver was proposed in [37],
which achieves a higher energy transfer efficiency. Relative to
this channel learning method, our proposed channel training
scheme targets at improving physical layer security in the
context of wiretap channels. We do not consider the cost of
feedback in the proposed channel training scheme, since in the
considered system the transmitter is only equipped with one
antenna and multiple antennas are only considered in the full-
duplex receiver. Our proposed scheme utilizes one property of
the full-duplex receiver to keep the pilot sequences unknown
to the eavesdropper (but known at the receiver) in order to
prevent the eavesdropper from learning her corresponding
channels, which leads to an improved secrecy performance.
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C. Data Transmission with AN Following Secret CT
During the data symbol periods, Alice transmits a data
stream while Bob transmits AN to confuse Eve. In addition
to Eve, the AN also causes interference to Bob through the
self-interference channel due to channel estimation errors. In
general, Bob has two strategies to suppress such interference
based on the estimated self-interference channel H^s. First, Bob
can subtract the known part of AN based on H^s at his receive
antennas since Bob knows the AN he transmits. Second, Bob
can transmit AN in the null space of H^s, based on the idea
that AN that lies in the null space of H^s does not cause any
interference to Bob. We note that the second approach requires
that the number of Bob’s transmit antennas is greater than that
of his receive antennas, which is not satisfied in our system
model. Therefore, in this work we assume that Bob adopts the
first strategy to suppress the interference caused by the AN.
The received signal at Bob in each data symbol period is
given by
yB =
p
PAdhx+
rPBa
NB
Hsn+ vB ; (11)
=
p
PAd(h^+~h)x+
rPBa
NB
(H^s+ ~Hs)n+vB ; (12)
where x 2 C11 denotes the transmitted signal satisfying
E[jxj2] = 1, n 2 CNB1 is the AN vector, whose entries are
i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex normal random variables
with zero mean and unit variance, and vB 2 CNB1 is the
noise vector at Bob with i.i.d entries, each of which follows the
distribution CN (0; 2B). Knowing H^s and n, Bob can remove
H^sn from yB by subtraction and obtain the effective received
signal as
y0B =
p
PAdh^x+
p
PAd~hx+
rPBa
NB
~Hsn+ vB ; (13)
where
pPBa=NB ~Hsn is the residual self-interference. Al-
though Bob knows that his received signal is subject to
interference caused by channel estimation errors in h and Hs,
he cannot suppress such interference since he does not know
~h and ~Hs. As such, the optimal combining technique that
maximizes the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at Bob is maximum ratio combining (MRC) based on h^. Then,
focusing on the CP (similar to the outage probability) and
following [38], the instantaneous SINR at Bob for given h^, ~h,
and ~Hs is
B =
Bkh^k2
B jh^y~hj2
kh^k2 +
Skh^y ~Hsk2
kh^k2 + 1
; (14)
where B = PAd=2B and S = PBa=2B=NB .
Likewise, the received signal at Eve in one data symbol
period is given by
yE =
p
PAdg^x+
p
PAd~gx+
rPBa
NB
Gjn+ vE ; (15)
where vE 2 CNE1 is the noise vector at Eve with i.i.d entries,
each of which follows the distribution CN (0; 2E). We note
that, due to the known structure of the pilots SB , Eve may
still obtain some information on the jamming channel matrix
Gj , even though she does not know either SB or PBp. For
example, she can approximate GjG
y
j by ZEZ
y
E . Due to the
uncertainty in the information on Gj leaked to Eve, it is very
difficult to determine the optimal combining strategy at Eve,
and the optimal strategy will lead to mathematically intractable
analysis. As confirmed numerically, the MRC strategy can out-
perform the MMSE combining strategy with GjG
y
j  ZEZyE
in terms of achieving higher SINRs at Eve. As such, in this
work we assume that Eve adopts MRC based on g^ to combine
the received signals. Then, following (15) the SINR at Eve for
the secret CT scheme is given by
E =
Ekg^k2
E jg^y~gj2
kg^k2 +
Jkg^yGjk2
kg^k2 + 1
; (16)
where E = PAd=2E and J = PBa=2E=NB .
D. Traditional Channel Training Scheme as a Benchmark
In order to better illustrate the benefits of the secret CT
scheme, we now consider the traditional CT scheme as a
benchmark. Unlike the secret CT scheme, in the traditional
CT scheme the pilot transmitted by Bob (i.e., SB) is pub-
licly known, which can be jointly designed with the pilot
transmitted by Alice (i.e., sA). As such, in the traditional CT
scheme we do not need the constraint TB = NB because
Bob’s pilots are known by Eve anyway. Hence, Alice and
Bob can simultaneously transmit pilots over 1 + NB symbol
periods while still ensuring the orthogonality of their pilots.
This setting also guarantees a fair comparison between the
secret CT scheme and the traditional CT scheme, since the
total number of symbol periods allocated to CT is 1 +NB in
both schemes. A transmission block of T symbols with the
traditional CT scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 (b). Therefore,
2
h^
, 2~h, and 
2
~Hs
(which are given by (3), (4), (5), (6), and
(9), respectively, in the secret CT scheme) for the traditional
CT scheme are changed to
2
h^
=
PAp(1 +NB)
PAp(1 +NB) + 2B
; (17)
2~h =
2B
PAp(1 +NB) + 2B
; (18)
2g^ =
PAp(1 +NB)
PAp(1 +NB) + 2E
; (19)
2~g =
2E
PAp(1 +NB) + 2E
; (20)
2~Hs =
2B
2
s
PBp2s(1 +NB)=NB + 2B
: (21)
In the traditional CT scheme, the pilot SB is public and thus
Eve can estimate the jamming channel Gj . The estimation
error of Gj can be obtained in a similar format as given in
(21). Since Eve knows that her received signal is subject to the
interference caused by the channel estimation error and AN,
the optimal combining technique that maximizes the SINR at
Eve is MMSE based on g^ and her estimate of Gj (denoted by
G^j). Here, we note that MMSE outperforms MRC in terms of
achieving a higher SINR at Eve in the traditional CT scheme.
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This is due to the fact that MMSE utilizes Eve’s knowledge
of G^j (in addition to g^) to suppress the interference in order
to maximize the SINR, while MRC ignores the available G^j .
Following (15) and applying the MMSE combiner, for the
traditional CT scheme the instantaneous SINR at Eve is
E =
PAdwg^g^ywy
w

PBa
NB
G^jG^
y
j+
PBa
NB
~Gj ~G
y
j+PAd~g~gy+2EINE

wy
;
(22)
where
w = g^y

G^jG^
y
j + 
2
EINE
 1
: (23)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE SECRET
CHANNEL TRAINING SCHEME
During the data symbol periods, Alice adopts a fixed-rate
wiretap code that can be described by two rate parameters,
namely, the codeword rate RB and the redundancy rate RE ,
which are predetermined and fixed [40]–[42]. The actual
information rate is given by Rs = RB   RE . For such a
coding scheme, Bob cannot reliably decode the transmitted
information when the capacity of the main channel (i.e.,
CB) is less than RB , while perfect secrecy against Eve fails
when the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel (i.e., CE)
is larger than RE [40]–[42]. We refer to the probability of
achieving reliable decoding as CP and refer to the probability
of failing to achieve perfect secrecy as SOP. We note that
one conventional secrecy outage probability in the literature
is defined as the probability of the secrecy capacity Cs being
less than the secrecy rate Rs, where Cs = CB   CE . In this
work, the reliability cannot be guaranteed due to the fact that
the main channel suffers from estimation errors, i.e., CB is
not available. As such, if we adopt the conventional secrecy
outage probability in this work, it will be a combination of the
CP and SOP and cannot separate the CP and SOP. Therefore,
in this work we adopt RB and RE as the two interesting code
parameters to derive the CP and SOP, respectively. Although
the ergodic secrecy capacity can be formulated for a passive
eavesdropping scenario where Alice and Bob do not know
the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel, in this work we did
not adopt it as a performance metric. First, in this work we
assume that all wireless channels are subject to independent
quasi-static Rayleigh fading, for which outage probability is
more appropriate than ergodic channel capacity, regardless of
whether secrecy or non-secrecy communication is considered
[43]. In addition, there exists a certain SOP associated with the
ergodic secrecy capacity. Thus, the ergodic secrecy capacity
cannot fully capture the secrecy performance of the system.
We also note that the secrecy rate Rs is different from the
secrecy capacity examined in [44] from the perspective of
information theory. In [44], the secrecy capacity is achieved by
encryption over the channel. Without encryption, the secrecy
capacity is achieved only when the instantaneous CSI of both
the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel is available
at Alice. Due to channel estimation error on the main channel
and the passive eavesdropping scenario for the eavesdropper’s
channel, the secrecy transmission rate suffers from connection
outages and secrecy outages. As such, in this work we focus
on analyzing the CP and SOP.
A. Connection Probability
The CP, which is the probability that Bob can decode the
message for a given RB with a negligible decoding error
probability, is given by [38], [45]
Pc=Pr(log2(1 + B)RB): (24)
We derive the CP of the secret CT scheme in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The CP of the secret CT scheme is derived as
Pc =
cNBe
  ch
 (NB + 1) (NB)(cH + h)NB

NB 1X
i=0
 
NB 1
i

 (NB + i+ 1)
(cH + h)i+1(Hh) i 1


2F1

1; NB + i+ 1;NB + 1;
h
cH + h

  2F1

1; NB + i+ 1;NB + 1;
h(t H)
t(cH + h)

; (25)
where c = 2RB   1, h = B2h^, H = S2~H , t = B2~h,
 (n) is the Gamma function given by  (n) = (n   1)!
for positive integer n, and 2F1(; ; ; ) denotes the Gauss
hypergeometric function [46, Eq. (9.100)].
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
We would like to clarify that the derived CP given in (25)
is indeed a function of all power parameters, i.e., PAp, PAd,
PBp, and PBa. This is due to the fact that following (3) and
(4) both h and t are functions of PAp and PAd while H
is a function of PBp and PBa as per (9).
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
The SOP, which is the probability that the capacity of the
eavesdropper’s channel is no less than RE , is given by [45]
Pso = Pr (log2(1 + E)  RE) : (26)
We derive the SOP of the secret CT scheme for positive 2E
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The SOP of the secret CT scheme for positive
2E is derived as
Pso =
dNEe
  dg NB NEg
 (NB + 1) (NE)(dJ + g)NB

NE 1X
i=0
 
NE 1
i

 (NB + i+ 1)
(dJ + g)i+1(Jg) i 1


2F1

1; NB + i+ 1;NB + 1;
g
dJ + g

  2F1

1; NB + i+ 1;NB + 1;
g(d J)
d(dJ + g)

;
(27)
where d = 2RE   1, g = E2g^ , and d = E2~g .
Proof: Comparing (16) with (14), we find that E follows
the same type of distribution as B . As such, the proof is
similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and thus omitted here.
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IV. OPTIMAL TRANSMIT POWER ALLOCATION IN THE
SECRET CHANNEL TRAINING SCHEME
We have seen in the previous section that the power
values are key design parameters affecting the connection
and secrecy performances. In this section, we determine the
optimal transmit power allocation between CT and data/AN
transmission at Alice and Bob in the secret CT scheme under
average power constraints. We note that in the considered
passive eavesdropping scenario, the instantaneous SINR at
Eve is not available and thus the power allocation does not
depend on the instantaneous SINR at Eve. In particular, we
cannot achieve the optimal power allocation that maximizes
the secrecy capacity of the considered system.
A. Objective Function
As mentioned in Section III, data transmission in the
considered wiretap channel may incur connection and secrecy
outages. Considering block fading channels, we adopt the
effective throughput subject to a given secrecy constraint as
our key performance metric, which is given by [42]
 =
T NB 1
T
(RB RE)Pc; (28)
s.t. Pso  ;
where  is the maximum allowable SOP (i.e., the predeter-
mined secrecy requirement of the system) and RB > RE in
order to ensure a positive information rate. In this work, we
consider fixed-rate transmission, in which RB and RE are a
priori fixed. We note that T is fixed in our system model, and
thus the maximization of  subject to Pso   given in (28)
is equivalent to the following optimization
maxPc s.t. Pso  : (29)
We note that we cannot guarantee perfect secrecy (i.e., the
SOP cannot be zero) in (28) due to the fact that Alice does
not have perfect CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel due to
the passive eavesdropping scenario and/or channel estimation
errors. We also note that in this work we cannot consider
the case of NB ! 1 for a given finite T . This is due to
the fact that the number of time slots used to estimate the
self-interference channel is at least the same as NB in order
to achieve a reliable channel estimate. In order to achieve a
positive effective secrecy throughput, we have NB < T   1
as per (28).
B. Power Allocation under Average Power Constraints
In this work, we consider an average power constraint at
both Alice and Bob. Following (29) the power allocation
optimization for the secret CT scheme can be presented as
max
PAp;PAd;PBp;PBa
Pc; (30)
s.t. Pso  ; (31)
PAp + PAd(T  NB   1)  EA; (32)
PBpNB + PBa(T  NB   1)  EB; (33)
where EA and EB are respectively the total powers available
at Alice and Bob for each block of T symbol periods; hence,
the average power constraints per symbol for Alice and Bob
are EA=T and EB=T . We next detail how to determine the
solution to (30) (i.e., the optimal values of PAd, PAp, PBa,
and PBp).
Theorem 3: The optimal value of PAd that maximizes Pc
subject to the constraints given in (31), (32), and (33) can be
obtained through
PAd = argmax
0<PAd<PmAd
Pc(PyAp;PAd;PyBp;PyBa); (34)
where
PmAd =
EA
T  NB   1 ; (35)
PyAp = EA   PAd(T  NB   1); (36)
PyBp =
EB   PyBa(T  NB   1)
NB
; (37)
and PyBa as a function of PAd can be obtained by solving the
following equation
Pso = : (38)
Proof: We first note that Pso and Pc are both mono-
tonically decreasing functions of PBa. As such, Pso =  is
always achieved in order to maximize Pc subject to the secrecy
constraint (31). Otherwise (i.e., if Pso < ), we can decrease
PBa to increase Pc. Following (27), we note that Pso only
depends on PBa and PAd. As such, we can obtain PyBa as a
function of PAd by solving (38). We also note that Pso is not
a function of PAp or PBp, while Pc monotonically increases
as PAp or PBp increases. Then, we can conclude that the
equality in both (32) and (33) is always guaranteed, which
leads to (36) and (37), respectively. Finally, (35) is achieved
due to PAp > 0. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
By substituting PAd, PAp, PBa, and PBp into (25), we
can obtain the maximum CP of the secret CT scheme. We
note that the optimization problem given in (34) can be solved
by a one-dimensional numerical search. Specifically, we can
adopt a grid search on PAd to solve this optimization problem,
since its value must lie in the interval (0;PmAd) as given in
Theorem 3. We can pick a value of PAd within (0;PmAd), then
determine the values of PyAp, PyBa, and PyBp as per Theorem 3,
and finally achieve a value of Pc following Theorem 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to examine the
secrecy performance of the proposed secret CT scheme with
the non-secret CT scheme as the benchmark. We note that it
is the ratio between the transmit power (i.e.,PAp, PAd, PBp,
and PBa) and the receiver noise power (i.e., 2B) that affects
the numerical results. We also note that the unit of the wiretap
code rates (i.e., RB and RE) in this work is the bit, which is
omitted as well.
In Fig. 3 we plot Pc with different choices of pilot transmit
power values. In this figure, we first observe that Pc increases
as PAp or PBp increases. This is due to the fact that as PAp
and PBp increase, the channel estimation errors for the main
self-interference channels decrease, respectively. Furthermore,
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Fig. 3. Connection probability Pc versus PBp for different values of PAp
where PAd = PBa = 20dB, RB = 5, NB = 3, 2s = 1, and 2B = 1.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability Pso versus NE for different values of
NB , where PAd = 10dB, PBa = 20dB, PAp = 10dB, PBp = 20dB,
2E = 1, and RE = 2.
we observe that the CP of the non-secret CT scheme is higher
than that of the secret CT scheme under the specific non-
optimized and unconstrained settings. This can be explained by
the fact that in the non-secret CT scheme both Alice and Bob
transmit pilots in NB + 1 symbol periods while in the secret
CT scheme Alice and Bob transmit pilots in 1 and NB symbol
periods, respectively, and thus for fixed PAp and PBp more
power is utilized in the non-secret CT scheme. As we will
show in Fig. 5, this observation does not hold when the power
allocation is optimized under the average power constraints as
well as the secrecy outage constraint.
In Fig. 4 we plot Pso versus the number of antennas at Eve
for different numbers of antennas at Bob. As expected, in this
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15
0
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0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Fig. 5. The maximum connection probability of the secret and non-secret
CT schemes versus the secrecy constraint  for different values of NE , where
NB = 8, RB = 5, RE = 3, T = 300, EA=T = EB=T = 10dB, 2s = 1,
and 2B = 0dB.
figure we first observe that when NE = 1 the SOP is the same
for the secret CT scheme and the non-secret CT scheme, due
to the fact that knowing the CSI of the jamming channel in
the non-secret CT scheme does not help Eve for NE = 1.
For NE > 1, we observe that Pso for the secret CT scheme is
significantly lower than that for the non-secret CT scheme and
the gap increases as NE increases. This can be explained by
the fact that in the secret CT scheme Eve does not know the
jamming channel while she does in the non-secret CT scheme
and the CSI of the jamming channel offers more information
to Eve as NE increases. Finally, the figure confirms that Pso
decreases as NB increases.
In Fig. 5 we plot the maximum CPs of the secret and non-
secret CT schemes versus the secrecy constraint indicator  for
different values of NE . In this figure and the following figures,
we set a small value -20dB for 2E . In this figure, we first
observe that as  increases the maximum CP increases, which
demonstrates the tradeoff between the effective throughput and
the secrecy constraint. For example, by comparing the values
of the maximum CP for  = 0:01 and  = 0:15 we can see a
high cost for reducing the maximum CP to achieve secrecy. We
also observe that the proposed secret CT scheme significantly
outperforms the non-secret CT scheme in terms of achieving
a much higher maximum CP. This is due to the fact that the
secret CT scheme prevents Eve from obtaining the CSI of
the jamming channel. This observation also demonstrates the
benefits of transmitting AN by a full-duplex Bob relative to
transmitting AN by an external helper. Finally, we observe that
the performance gap between these two schemes increases as
NE increases.
Under the same settings as in Fig. 5, we plot Alice’s optimal
transmit power for data (i.e., PAd) and Bob’s optimal transmit
power for AN (i.e., PBa) versus  in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7,
respectively. We first observe that PAd increases as  increases
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Fig. 6. Alice’s optimal data transmit power PAd versus the secrecy constraint
 for different values of NE , where NB = 8, RB = 5, RE = 3, T = 300,
2s = 1, EA=T = EB=T = 10dB, and 2B = 0dB.
in Fig. 6, which demonstrates that more transmit power is
allocated to data transmission as the secrecy constraint is
relaxed. We also observe that PBa decreases as  increases
in Fig. 7, which demonstrates that as the secrecy constraint
is relaxed less transmit power is allocated to AN at Bob. In
Fig. 6, we further observe that more transmit power is allocated
to data transmission at Alice as NE decreases. In Fig. 7, we
observe that less transmit power is allocated to AN at Bob
as NE decreases. As expected, in Fig. 6 we see that PAd for
the secret CT scheme is higher than that for the non-secret
CT scheme and in Fig. 7 we see that PBa for the secret CT
scheme is lower than that for the non-secret CT scheme. This
is due to the fact that Eve obtains less information regarding
the jamming channel in the secret CT scheme.
In Fig. 8 we examine the impact of the fading power of the
self-interference channel 2s (i.e., the variance of each entry in
Hs) on the secrecy performance and power allocation of the
secret CT scheme. As expected, we observe that the maximum
connection probability of the secret CT scheme decreases as
2s increases in Fig. 8(a). This is due to the fact that, according
to (9), the channel estimation error of Hs increases as 2s
increases, which means that the connection probability for the
secret CT scheme is a monotonically decreasing function of
2s . Noting the limited value range of the y-axis in Fig. 8(a),
we would like to highlight that the secrecy performance of
the secret CT scheme is insensitive to 2s , especially when
2s > 0dB. In Fig. 8(b), we observe that Bob’s optimal pilot
transmit power PBp first increases and then remains constant
as 2s increases. The initial increase in PBp is due to the fact
that as 2s increases the performance of the channel estimation
decreases and thus more power should be allocated to the
channel training to counteract this performance loss in the
estimate of the self-interference channel. Again, noting the
limited value range of the y-axis in Fig. 8(b), we can conclude
that the power allocation of the secret CT scheme is insensitive
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Fig. 7. Bob’s optimal AN transmit power PBa versus the secrecy constraint
 for different values of NE , where NB = 8, RB = 5, RE = 3, T = 300,
2s = 1, EA=T = EB=T = 10dB, and 2B = 0dB.
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Fig. 8. The maximum connection probability and Bob’s optimal pilot
transmit power for the secret CT scheme versus the fading power of the
self-interference channel 2s , where  = 0:10, RB = 5, RE = 3, T = 300,
NB = NE = 2, EA=T = 15dB, EB=T = 10dB, and 2B = 0dB.
to 2s as well.
In the secret CT scheme Bob can transmit AN during the
training of the main channel to further enhance the physical
layer security of the considered system, since the transmitted
AN can increase the estimation error of the eavesdropper’s
channel. The role of AN in channel training in wiretap
channels has been examined in the literature (e.g., [25], [35],
[36]). When Bob transmits AN during the training of the
main channel, the estimation error of the main channel will
depend on the realization of the self-interference channel and
the estimation error of the eavesdropper’s channel will depend
on the realization of the jamming channel, which makes the
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closed-form performance analysis mathematically intractable.
As such, we numerically approximate the performance of the
updated secret CT scheme, in which the training of the self-
interference channel is conducted before the training of the
main channel and the transmission of AN by Bob is considered
during the training of the main channel. As expected, we
confirm that the transmission of AN by Bob during the training
of the main channel improves the performance of the proposed
scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we devised a new secret CT scheme based
on the fact that in the wiretap channel with a full-duplex
receiver, Bob knows exactly what he transmits. To study the
performance of the proposed secret CT scheme, we derived
closed-form expressions for the CP and SOP, based on which
the power allocation between CT and data/AN transmission is
optimized. Our examination demonstrates that when NE > 1
the secret CT scheme significantly outperforms the non-secret
CT scheme in terms of achieving a much higher CP subject to
the same secrecy constraint, and when NE = 1 they achieve
the same secrecy performance. The secrecy performance im-
provement of the secret CT scheme relative to the non-secret
CT scheme increases as NE increases.
APPENDIX A
Following (14), we can rewrite B as
B =
Bn
Bs + 1
; (39)
where Bn = Bkh^k2, Bs = B1 + B2 , B1 =
B jh^y~hj2=kh^k2, and B2 = Skh^y ~Hsk2=kh^k2. We note
that here kh^k2 is a random variable since we are interested
in the channel-independent CP, based on which the power
allocation between channel estimation and data transmission
can be determined. We note that Bn and Bs are independent
due to the fact that h^, ~h, and ~Hs are independent of each other,
and thus following (24) we have
Pc = Pr
 
B  2RB   1

= Pr

Bs 
Bn   c
c

a
=
Z 1
c
FBs

x  c
c

fBn (x)dx
=
Z 1
0
FBs
x
c

fBn (x+ c)dx; (40)
where a= is achieved by noting Bs  0, FBs () is the cdf of
Bs , fBn () is the probability density function (pdf) of Bn ,
and as defined in Theorem 1 we have c = 2RB   1. We recall
that the entries of h^ are i.i.d and each of them follows the
distribution CN (0; 2
h^
), thus fBn () is given by [43]
fBn (x) =
xNB 1
 (NB)
NB
h
e
  xh : (41)
We next derive an expression for FBs () when t 6= H ,
i.e., FBs (x) = Pr(B1 + B2  x). Since h^ and ~h are
independent, the cdf of B1 is given by [43]
FB1 (x) = 1  e
x
t : (42)
Given that h^ is independent of ~Hs, the pdf of B2 is given
by [43]
fB2 (x) =
xNB 1
 (NB)
NB
H
e
  xH : (43)
We note that B1 and B2 are independent. As such, for t 6=
H we can derive FBs (x) as
FBs (x) =
Z x
0
FB1 (x  y)fB2 (y)dy
=
Z x
0
h
1  e x yt
i
fB2 (y)dy
=
Z x
0
fB2 (y)dy  
e 
x
t
 (NB)
NB
H
Z x
0
yNB 1e 
(t H )y
tH dy
b
=


NB ;
x
H

 (NB)
 
NBt e
  xt 

NB ;
(t H)x
tH

 (NB) (t H)NB
; (44)
where b= is achieved with the aid of the following identity [46,
Eq. (3.351.1)]Z u
0
xne xdx =  n 1(n+ 1; u); (45)
and (n; t) is the lower incomplete gamma function, which
can be expanded for positive integer n as
(n; t) = (n  1)!
"
1  e t
n 1X
m=0
tm
m!
#
: (46)
Then, substituting (41) and (44) into (40), we have
Pc =
 NBh
 (NB)2
Z 1
0
(x+c)NB 1e 
x+c
h 

NB ;
x
cH

dx
  
NB
t 
 NB
h
 (NB)2
Z 1
0
(x+c)NB 1
e
x+c
h
+ xct


NB ;
(t H)x
ctH

dx
c
=
e
  ch  NBh
 (NB)2
NB 1X
i=0

NB   1
i

cNB i 1 Z 1
0
xie
  xh 

NB ;
x
cH

dx 
NBt
(t H)NB
Z 1
0
xi
e
ct+h
cth
x


NB;
(t H)x
ctH

dx

;
(47)
where c= is obtained with the aid of the following identity [46,
Eq. (1.111)]
(a+ x)n =
nX
i=0

n
i

xian i: (48)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 11
We then solve the integrals in (47) and obtain the results in
(25) with the aid of the following identity [46, Eq. (6.455.2)]Z 1
0
xu 1
ex
(v; x)dx=
v (u+v)
v(+)u+v
2F1

1; u+v; v+1;

+

;
[+  > 0;  > 0; u+ v > 0]: (49)
So far, we have proved (25) for t 6= H . We next prove (25)
for the special case of t = H . Noting (42), (43), and that
h^ is independent of ~h, for t = H we have
FBs (x) =


NB + 1;
x
t

 (NB + 1)
=


NB + 1;
x
H

 (NB + 1)
d
=


NB ;
x
H

 (NB)
 

x
H
NB
e
  xH
 (NB + 1)
; (50)
where d= is achieved with the aid of (N+1; x) = N(N; x) 
xNe x. Then, substituting (41) and (50) into (40), for t =
H we have
Pc =
 NBh
 (NB)2
Z 1
0
(x+c)NB 1e 
x+c
h 

NB ;
x
cH

dx
  
 NB
h (cH)
 NB
 (NB) (NB + 1)
Z 1
0
xNB (x+c)NB 1e 
x+c
h
  xcH dx
=
e
  ch  NBh
 (NB)2
NB 1X
i=0

NB   1
i

cNB i 1 Z 1
0
xie
  xh 

NB;
x
cH

dx 
(cH)
 NB
NB
Z 1
0
xNB+ie
  cH+hcHh xdx

e
=
cNBe
  ch
 (NB + 1) (NB)(cH + h)NB

NB 1X
i=0
 
NB 1
i

 (NB + i+ 1)
(cH + h)i+1(Hh) i 1

2F1

1; NB + i+ 1;NB + 1;
h
cH + h

  1

; (51)
where e= is achieved with the aid of (49) and the following
identity [46, Eq. (3.351.3)]Z 1
0
xne uxdx = n!u n 1; u > 0: (52)
We note that for t = H in (25) we have
2F1

1; NB + i+ 1;NB + 1;
h(t   H)
t(cH + h)

= 1: (53)
As such, comparing (51) with (25) we know that (25) is also
valid for the special case of t = H . Therefore, following
(47) and (51) the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
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